STATEMENT
by the Representative of the Russian Federation
in the First Committee of the 75th Session of the UN General Assembly
at the Thematic Debate on «Other Weapons of Mass Destruction»

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC) is now in its third decade as one of the most important elements within the international system of disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It addresses two key issues: the elimination of an entire class of weapons of this kind and the establishment of firm barriers against the production, use, and proliferation of chemical weapons. The Russian Federation was at the origin of the CWC and has consistently supported its strengthening. Our country has faithfully fulfilled its obligations under this international treaty. Back in September 2017, we destroyed the world's largest arsenal of chemical weapons – around 40,000 tonnes – ahead of schedule and under proper international control. This fact was certified by the Technical Secretariat of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). We encourage the United States to follow suit as it has all financial and technological capacities to eliminate its remaining stockpiles of toxic substances as soon as possible. 

The current situation within the OPCW gives rise to serious concern. Continuing split within the Organization caused by the politicization of its activities and imposing on the Organization of matters outside the legal framework of the Convention, delusion of the OPCW mandate, departure from the practice of consensus, and adoption of illegitimate decisions by vote – all this presents the effective achievement of goals and objectives of the Convention and seriously damages the reputation of the Organization as an independent expert body on chemical weapons.

The adoption in June 2018 at the Fourth Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties of the decision to vest the OPCW Technical Secretariat with attributive powers to identify those responsible for the use of chemical weapons is illegitimate. Activities of the OPCW Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) ("attribution team") established as a follow-up to this decision are contrary to the CWC and are infringing on the exclusive prerogatives of the United Nations Security Council.

IIT investigation is based on reports by the Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) in Syria, whose methods of work raise many questions. In its activities, the FFM relies on evidence obtained remotely from groups opposed to the Syrian Government; investigations are conducted without following a clear chain of custody procedure specified in the CWC, i.e., the collection of evidence only by Mission experts on site. We also have questions about the staffing of the FFM which mainly includes representatives of Western countries and their allies.

Conclusions of the Mission's Report on the investigation of the high-profile chemical incident in Douma on April 7, 2018, are a striking example. The document was written with an anti-Syrian attitude for subsequent submission for review by the “attribution mechanism”. Opinions of some of FFM experts who believe that this provocation was staged and confirm the credibility of information in this regard provided by the Syrian Government and the Russian military, were ignored, and the document was based on the opinion of some outside "experts". Attempts to get things straight, restore the actual events are blocked.

The first IIT report on incidents in Ltamenah in March 2017, published on April 8, 2020, containing conclusions of the alleged involvement of Syrian military and political leadership in these events confirmed the fears that the work of the team is politicized. The document turned out to be highly biased, unconvincing, unprofessional, and technically unreliable. It replicates politically motivated working methods of the FFM and the former OPCW-UN Joint Investigative Mechanism.

It is highly probable that the United States and its allies will use the UN platform to introduce a draft punitive resolution on Syria based on the conclusions of the IIT report that was essentially fabricated. We believe that the introduction of sanctions against Damascus on international platforms based on unsubstantiated accusations of the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian Armed Forces is absolutely unacceptable.

The United Nations Security Council and the OPCW receive recurring evidence of the preparation of new chemical attacks and provocations by Syrian militants. Terrorists have their own technological and production capacities to synthesize actual warfare agents, as well as extensive supply chains for their precursors. There is a risk of recurrent chemical terrorism outside Syria as well. Therefore, it is now crucial to abandon political ambitions and focus on countering the real threat of chemical terrorism.

We strongly reject ungrounded accusations by the United Kingdom of the involvement of Russian citizens in the incidents with toxic chemicals in Salisbury and Amesbury. Their only goal is to mislead the international community. One evidence of this is London's lack of legal cooperation with Russia on the Skripal case. The UK has yet to present any evidence.

We view the situation regarding Russian blogger Alexei Navalny similarly. All our requests to the German side to engage in cooperation, including between law enforcement authorities and medical institutions, have been ignored. Rather, Berlin decided to follow the path Great Britain has adopted in the Skripal case orchestrated against Russia, by making groundless accusations in “megaphone diplomacy” style. At the same time, they ignore CWC provisions that specify States Parties' obligations to cooperate in order to clarify concerns. All of the above only strengthens our conviction that the German side is not interested in clarifying the circumstances of the incident, and this whole story is used to strengthen the public perception of Russia as a violator of the CWC to justify sanctions planned against our country beforehand.

Mr. Chairman,

We are making all the efforts to strengthen the Convention on the Prohibition of Biological and Toxin Weapons (BWC) which remains a reliable instrument to eliminate threats of biological agents used as weapons and promote international cooperation in the biological field for peaceful purposes.

The effectiveness of the Convention can be ensured only by the full implementation of its provisions by all States Parties. A legally binding protocol to the Convention with an effective verification mechanism will contribute to the achievement of this objective.

We call upon all the Parties to take full advantage of the BWC Meetings of Experts scheduled for December in order to explore specific proposals with a view to improve the implementation of the Convention and prepare for further consideration at the Ninth BWC Review Conference in 2021.

In this regard the Russian proposals that enjoy wide international support and are action-oriented and relevant. In particular, we can refer to our initiative to establish mobile biomedical units to provide assistance in case of an alleged use of biological weapons for the purpose of investigating such use, and assistance in coping with the infectious diseases of various origins. Our concept of mobile units, based on the positive experience of Russian specialized anti-epidemic teams, including their participation in dealing with the Ebola epidemic in West Africa, would contribute to the implementation of the provisions of the BWC article VII (assistance and protection from biological weapons), article X (international co-operation in preventing and combating epidemics), and article VI (investigation of the alleged use of biological weapons).

We also propose to establish a scientific advisory committee under the Convention which mandate is to analyze the state of affairs related to biosecurity issues and make recommendations in that regard upon he request of States Parties. We are convinced that our proposal is timely and relevant.

We acknowledge that the BWC regime is currently being subjected to further challenges due to expanding military medico-biomedical activities of some States beyond their national borders. In this regard we have suggested refinements to a format of confidence-building measures under the Convention by inclusion in a reporting form data regarding biological military activities abroad in order to increase transparency and enhance confidence in compliance with the BWC. As a matter of principle we call upon Parties concerned to refrain from the militarization of public healthcare. We also count on the engagement of the consultation procedures established by the BWC to resolve all existing and potential issues related to the implementation of the BWC provisions.

While there is no visible progress in strengthening the BWC new ideas emerge aimed at shaping alternative arrangements and schemes that clearly undermine the Convention regime. We oppose so-called voluntary “peer reviews” of dual-use microbiology facilities designed to substitute BWC verification measures. Behind those manipulations one can see a wide window for subjective and speculative interpretations. We believe that all friends of the BWC should in every possible way support intersessional work carried out under the Convention in order to help converge positions of delegations and accelerate adoption and implementation of measures that could reduce the threat posed by biological weapons. There is no real alternative to this process in the framework of an international treaty with 183 States Parties. All decisions should be taken on the basis of the outcome of negotiations among States Parties.

Any attempts to impose on States schemes developed by some “unknown” in the absence of transparency and inclusiveness are absolutely unacceptable. Even more unacceptable is an attempt to rewrite BWC provisions in its key aspect related to investigations upon a complaint by a State with regard to an alleged violation of the Convention including possible use of biological weapons.

Therefore, we consider attempts to use the UN Secretary General's Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons to the detriment of the BWC to be unacceptable. We would like to draw attention to the need to update principles and procedures of the UN Secretary General's Mechanism. To that end we introduce to the UNGA 75th session a relevant draft resolution under the agenda item "General and Complete disarmament".

We call upon all UN Member States to support and co-sponsor the draft.

Thank you for your attention.