Statement

by the Representative of the Russian Federation
in the First Committee of the 75th Session of the UN General Assembly
at the Thematic Debate on «Nuclear Weapons»

Distinguished Mr. Chairman,

Distinguished colleagues,

The promotion of international efforts aimed at achieving a world free of nuclear weapons as soon as possible is one of priorities of Russian foreign policy. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), whose fiftieth anniversary since its entry into force we have celebrated this year, is fundamental for achieving this goal.

As a State Party to the NPT and one of its depositories, the Russian Federation strictly complies with all provisions of the Treaty. For decades, we have been consistently reducing our nuclear arsenal, as well as diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in national defense policy. We provide assistance and share our extensive experience in the field of peaceful nuclear energy development with other States Parties. We contribute to the strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system, which ensures reliable verification of States' compliance with their obligations under the Treaty.

States Parties should make every effort to address problems related to non-compliance with certain provisions of the NPT.

We consider necessary to put the end to the practice of the so-called NATO “nuclear sharing”, that is a violation of Article I and Article II of the NPT nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states members of the Alliance respectively.

We note that despite the urgency of nuclear disarmament issues, related discussions should not become a stumbling block in the collective efforts to strengthen the NPT and the nuclear non-proliferation regime in general. Nuclear disarmament, in accordance with Article VI of the NPT, is integrated into the broader context of general and complete disarmament and can only be carried out on a step-by-step basis, while complying with the principle of indivisible security for all and taking into account all factors affecting strategic stability.

We stress the importance of implementing the decisions adopted during past NPT review cycles.

We are ready to cooperate actively with all partners in order to overcome remaining differences on key issues and challenges facing the international community that hinder further strengthening of the Treaty regime.

We attach particular importance to the progress in the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other WMD in the Middle East (MEWMDFZ). This topic is one of the most debated within the framework of the NPT. The first Conference on this issue which was held in November 2019 in New York became the first practical step towards the establishment of the MEWMDFZ in many years. Russia actively contributed to its convening and successful holding. An open and inclusive dialogue to break the stalemate around the MEWMDFZ issues has been launched. It is important that all key countries to this process are engaged in these efforts.

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is a crucial instrument of the NPT regime and constitutes an effective measure in the field of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. Unfortunately, the Treaty, which was opened for signature a quarter of a century ago, still has not entered into force since not all of the Annex 2 States have implemented ratification procedures. Recently, the official refusal of the United States to ratify the CTBT, whose participation is essential to the CTBT, has further complicated the already difficult situation around the CTBT.

Mr. Chairman,

In recent years, we have witnessed a rapidly deteriorating situation in international security environment. At the same time, the arms control system, which has traditionally served as a kind of "safety net" for global strategic stability, is now experiencing an unprecedented crisis.

Against this background, it is no surprise that we hear more and more concerns from members of the international community about the prospects for nuclear disarmament, which are becoming increasingly uncertain.

Russia, as before, is ready to continue making a significant practical contribution towards a world free from the threat posed by WMD, nuclear in the first place. We remain committed to the ultimate goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and fully implement our obligations under Article VI of the NPT.

As a result of reductions carried out under bilateral treaties with the United States, the overall capacity of Russian strategic arms has been consistently reduced by 85 percent. Russia continues to fully comply with its obligations under the New START Treaty. By the Treaty’s control date, February 5, 2018, we had reduced our arsenal even below the established central limits.

The New START Treaty will expire in February 2021. We have repeatedly emphasized that we support its extension without preconditions. Our official proposal in this regard was submitted to the United States back in December last year and repeated recently. We are convinced that the extension would be a reasonable step that would allow preventing further deterioration of the situation in the area of strategic stability and would help avoid total collapse of control and limitation mechanisms in nuclear and missile sphere. We could gain time to discuss how arms control and control on military technology should be organized in new environment, and who could be a part of possible future arrangements.

The termination of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) as a result of the U.S. Side’s withdrawal is deeply regrettable. Moreover, this withdrawal was made against the background of a reckless propaganda campaign regarding alleged "Russian violations" of the Treaty, which is by no means true.

Two types of ground-based nuclear missiles have been eliminated under the INF Treaty. Now it turns out that in terms of the Treaties in the field of nuclear and missile disarmament the world rolls back 30 years. At the same time, there is a significant risk of a missile arms race in different regions. Russia shows the most responsible approach with regard to the INF Treaty collapse. In order to ensure predictability and restraint in this area, we unilaterally imposed a moratorium on the deployment of intermediate- and shorter-range ground-based missiles in those regions of the world until similar U.S.-manufactured weapons are deployed there.

We have invited NATO countries to declare a similar reciprocal step. There has been no constructive response to this Russian initiative. Nevertheless, the commitment made by Russia remains valid. We still consider the moratorium to be a promising idea that would allow us to avoid new "missile crises" while keeping opportunities for mutually acceptable solutions. We call on everyone to show readiness and political will for a dialogue on ensuring predictability and restraint in the missile sphere.

We affirm with all responsibility that Russia did not have and does not have intermediate- and shorter-range ground-based missiles. To claim otherwise means to create a deliberately false picture and cover the actions of those who bear the real blame for the current situation.

All Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons, the number of which has been reduced by four times compared to the level the USSR had in 1991, have been turned into non-deployed category and remain located at centralized storage facilities within the national territory. Against this background, we cannot but be concerned about the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in the territory of non-nuclear-weapon states of Europe and the training of their use within NATO with involvement of non-nuclear-weapon states. We have repeatedly drawn attention to the fact that such actions constitute a direct violation of the NPT.

Mr. Chairman,

We believe it necessary to devote the utmost attention to building upon a discussion to consider in detail all significant issues related to maintaining an adequate level of international security and strategic stability based on the principle of equal and indivisible security for all. Without such a consideration it would be difficult to make progress on a nuclear disarmament path. This includes the already mentioned problems, as well as such issues as the unconstrained deployment of the U.S. global missile defense system, development of high-precision strategic offensive non-nuclear weapons, the prospective deployment of strike weapons in outer space, attempts to weaken the defensive potential of other countries by illegitimate methods of economic pressure bypassing the UN Security Council.

Russia is open to any ideas with regard to multilateral negotiation formats to prevent an arms race and strengthen international security and stability. We believe that such ideas should be implemented on the basis of consensus, taking into account the legitimate interests and concerns of all potential participants. We consider as counterproductive any attempts to "force" someone to participate in such discussions through blackmail and threats and, even worse, to create artificial obstacles for the development of dialogue and interaction on the most pressing issues of today.

We believe that attempts to demand that the nuclear-weapon states abandon their arsenals unconditionally, without taking into account current strategic reality and their legitimate interests in security area, are counterproductive. Such actions run counter to the principles of the maintenance of international stability, equal and indivisible security for all, and lead to growing divisions between members of the international community. We, therefore, consider development and promotion of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons to be a mistake.

Mr. Chairman,

Under current circumstances, restraint and responsible behavior on behalf of nuclear-weapon states is more critical than ever. That is why we have consistently advocated the reaffirmation by Russia and the U.S., as well as by all P5 countries, of the fundamental formula that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. We believe that it is one of the key tasks to prevent a recurrence of the tragic events of 75 years ago, when the United States used nuclear bombing against the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Thank you for your attention.