STATEMENT
by the Representative of the Russian Federation
in the First Committee of the 75th Session of the UN General Assembly
at the Thematic Debate on «Outer Space (Disarmament Aspects)»

Mr Chairman,

Outer space is the common heritage of humankind. In this regard the objective for the world community is to ensure the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, for the benefit and in the interest of all countries. Guided by that very understanding as of back to 1978, the first UNGA Special session on disarmament determined the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS) and the launch of relevant negotiations in accordance with a spirit of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty as one of the key disarmament measures. The said objectives have been annually reaffirmed by the UNGA resolution on PAROS permanently supported and co-sponsored by the Russian Federation.

However, we have to note the trend that is gaining strength towards revision of those goals leading to destabilization of the space security activities as well as the international security in general. In 2020 some states pursued policies aimed at using the outer space for combat operations and deployment of strike weapons systems. Those policies are already officially enshrined in relevant national doctrines.

The most far-reaching ones are contained in the US’s renewed Defense Space Strategy and the Space Force Doctrine. The documents set out the objective of achieving military superiority to the extent of absolute supremacy in outer space which they regard only as a theater of a battlefield. The US Space Force’ activities are focused on enhancing space combat capabilities for both deterrence and "enforcement" operations. The US identified as a primary goal the restriction of "adversaries’" access and freedom of actions in outer space and, where and as necessary, degrading the effectiveness of their military capabilities both on Earth and in cyberspace.

Furthermore, the US and their allies aim for conducting both defensive (including so called active defense) and offensive (including preventive measures) space military operations. To impose its will on others the US Space Force is instructed to use force (including "physical destruction of an adversary military capabilities"), or threat of use force in, from or with regard to outer space. There is also a possibility to use US space military assets to destroy ground targets at any location on Earth, i.e. against any state.

Simultaneously, the US and its allies continue to build up their capabilities including kinetic and non-kinetic means to be engaged against outer space objects. This refers, inter alia, to directed energy weapons, electronic warfare systems, and potential application of inspection and servicing satellites in their capacity of antisatellite weapons. NATO countries’ determination to deploy a large constellation of small satellites in outer space in the next few years cannot be but a question. We are aware that these systems can be used as “space mines” to affect the damage to space objects of other countries including Russia.

The US’s specific practical actions aimed at building a space-based BMD echelon (including interceptors) require particular attention. Relevant objectives are set out in the US Missile Defense Review of 17 January 2019.

Such US’s guidelines and actions pursued with support from and in coordination with its NATO allies only aggravate tensions among relations of the states and provoke an arms race in outer space. It is already crystal-clear that the realization of the intention to place weapons in outer space will have disastrous consequences for international security and strategic stability. This will lead to further degradation of trust between states, exacerbation of tensions, emergence of new threats and challenges, disruption of fundamental agreements in the area regarding the use of outer space as well as much lowered predictability and long term sustainability of outer space activities.

The most vivid example of such a cynicism is the fact that actions to build military space capabilities and the related space warfare missions, including those indented for offensive operations, are presented by the US and its allies as no more than allegedly consistent with international law and the 1967 Outer Space Treaty that promotes only peaceful uses of outer space. Any negotiations on a legally binding PAROS agreement are being blocked. Instead of negotiations on this kind of an international legally binding instrument, our opponents (US) prefer to focus on developing some politically binding and freely interpreted rules of the so-called "responsible behavior" designed to serve their own interests.

Those considerations only seek to further divide the world community – through a politicized discrimination of states into "responsible and irresponsible". At the same time such ones legitimize the above-mentioned doctrinal provisions of Western countries aimed at weaponizing outer space and space warfare under the pretext of confronting those qualified as "irresponsible". By starting the work on such considerations we would admit the very possibility of warfare in outer space, and consequently the use of force or threat of the use of force against outer space objects.

We are facing a clear attempt to revise the decisions of the first UNGA Special session on disarmament in 1978, refocus efforts of the UN Member States from pursuing the PAROS objectives towards elaborating rules for the use of force in outer space.

Russia and like-minded nations work together to prevent the arms race in outer space provoked by Western countries as well as the transformation of outer space into a battlefield. Over the recent years we have proposed a number of initiatives aimed at implementing the PAROS goals. The key initiative is the Russian-Chinese draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space, the threat or use of force against outer space objects which is currently subject to consideration at the Conference on Disarmament (CD). Regrettably, since a number of states led by the US are reluctant to show political will and agree to a compromise for the sake of enhancing international security, the CD so far can not commence the substantive work on the text of the treaty.

For the current First Committee session we have prepared the traditional UNGA draft resolution “No first placement of weapons in outer space”. Since 2014 this resolution has proved itself as an on-going practice within the UN platform and has been annually adopted by the UNGA, on the initiative of its three initial co-sponsors: Brazil, China and Russia. Far from affecting national interests of any state, the resolution seeks to mobilize the international community for support of the multilateral initiative/political commitment on PAROS proposed by Russia as far as in 2004. Over the past year, despite the coronavirus pandemic, another state – Burundi – has joined the initiative. Joint statements on PAROS with Myanmar and Turkmenistan are about to be signed. This will bring the number of full participants up to 25.

We also submit for consideration of the FC another traditional UNGA draft resolution “Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities (TCBMs)” which had been adopted without a vote since 2013 and was initially co-sponsored by Russia, China, and the USA. Yet, times changed and in 2018 the US refused not only to co-sponsor the resolution, but for no reason at all radically revised its stance on the resolution by voting against it. This looks especially eloquent given the fact that the work of the UN Commission on Disarmament which has space TCBMs as one of the items on its agenda has been blocked for two years due to, among other things, the non-issuance of the entry visa by the US authorities to the head of the Russian delegation.

We hope for wide support and co-sponsorship of our draft resolutions on outer space.

Thank you.