Mr President,

Colleagues,

First of all, thank you for the invitation, which provides me with an opportunity to address this forum once again. The last time I delivered my remarks here was four years ago, back in March 2011. Since then, threats related to international security have been accumulating and deep-running crises that are spanning countries, as well as regions have emerged. I'm saying this not to feed alarmism, but only to stress that it is in these kinds of turning periods that constructive, equal and multilateral cooperation is especially relevant for working out mutually acceptable approaches based on balanced interests, not the ambitions of those who view the whole world through the prism of their exceptionality.

Arms control, disarmament and WMD non-proliferation are also impacted by the complex and comprehensive nature of issues the international community is facing. We welcome the commitment of most countries to compromise, which paves the way to sustainable global and regional security and stability.

There is also a shared understanding of the need to make better use of the existing mechanisms – the unique triad in terms of its expert potential and experience: the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, the Conference on Disarmament and the United Nations Disarmament Commission. We are confident that there is no alternative to this triad in today's environment. All of its components are interlinked and complementary, and are based on the tried and tested mandates and rules of procedure.

The Conference on Disarmament, which served as a platform for devising a number of fundamental international treaties on arms control and non-proliferation, is of special importance. This negotiation platform is far from having exhausted its potential. While sharing the concern over the fact that the conference currently seems to be losing momentum, we advocate that it fully resume its functions by agreeing on a programme of work that will be acceptable for everyone. This will require everyone to be flexible and find a way to balance their interests. Of course, this should not be to the detriment of the Conference's fundamental principles.

A regular review conference of the NPT Treaty is to open less than two months from now. We are urging everyone to treat this document which is rightfully considered the cornerstone of global strategic stability and international security in the most careful manner.

One of the main tasks of the upcoming Review Conference is to confirm the commitment to the goals of the treaty, obligations stemming from it and to consolidate the treaty based on the action plan that was passed by consensus in 2010 and which remains absolutely current. We believe that all of the plan's provisions should be fulfilled.

In this connection, uncertainty with implementing a decision on the convocation of a conference to create a zone free from nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles in the Middle East evokes special concern. It appears that the efforts of many countries, including Russia, provided hope for finalising a reasonable "package" as regards the forum's agenda and procedures. However, it was impossible to hold this highly important event on schedule. Nevertheless, the task of launching talks to establish a zone free from weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East remains a high-priority issue on the international agenda, and we consider it important to continue a dialogue involving all regional countries for the purpose of convening the conference without delay.

We are praising the expansion of nuclear-free zones which are bringing us closer to the noble goal of creating a world without nuclear weapons. The signing by the five nuclear states of the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia last year became an important contribution to this process. Russia is also ready to sign a protocol to the Bangkok Treaty on the Southeast Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone.

I would like to single out constructive talks to resolve the situation around the Iranian nuclear programme among reassuring factors in the context of consolidating the NPT regime. We are doing our best to ensure successful and timely completion, and we are pressing for agreements that will firmly rest on NPT principles and the best IAEA practices.

An unprecedented chemical demilitarisation operation was completed successfully in the summer of 2014. Russia made a significant political and material contribution to removing all chemical weapons components and precursors from Syria; their withdrawal was made possible by the well-coordinated work of the United Nations, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and many countries including Syria itself whose government ensured compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) obligations under unprecedentedly difficult conditions and conscientiously cooperated with its foreign partners.

Mr Chairman,

Moscow is committed to the non-proliferation policy, as evidenced by its compliance with the Russian-US Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. Our priority under the treaty is to achieve the limits stipulated for strategic arms and delivery vehicles by 2018.

As President Vladimir Putin has said, we are willing to conduct a very serious and detailed discussion of non-proliferation issues without any double standards.

It is clear that the further bilateral reduction and limitation of nuclear weapons are only possible under conditions of equal and indivisible security for all countries without exception. This approach to nuclear disarmament is sealed in the 2010 NPT Action Plan, which was adopted by consensus. The importance of taking into account all factors that could affect global strategic stability in the nuclear disarmament process has been reaffirmed in a recent statement submitted to the forum by the Non-Proliferation Treaty Nuclear Weapons States (P5).

Strategic parity is affected by a number of factors, including unilateral actions by the United States and its allies in the area of ballistic missile defence, which have had a destructive effect on strategic stability by undermining movement toward nuclear zero, which, as far as I can see, is the goal of many people in this audience.

We cannot ignore the fact that many types of precision weapons have almost the same destructive force as nuclear weapons, and if nuclear weapon states dramatically reduce or liquidate their nuclear weapons, the states that are leading in the creation and production of precision weapons will have clear military superiority, which is fraught with the disruption of parity and destabilisation.

We are increasingly concerned that enforcement of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) has been delayed indefinitely. Unilateral moratoriums are certainly important, but they are not equivalent to treaty obligations. The CTBT must be ratified by all nuclear weapon states without exception. Russia accomplished this back in 2000.

Now, regarding non-strategic nuclear weapons. I'd like to recall that Russia, by implementing the 1991-1992 presidential initiatives, reduced by three quarters its arsenal of these weapons, transferred them to the non-deployed category and concentrated them at its central bases on its national territory. It took this unprecedented measure despite the fact that Europe still has operationally deployed US nuclear weapons that can reach Russian territory. Moreover, these American weapons are being upgraded, and some European non-nuclear NATO countries take an active part in so-called "joint nuclear missions." This training in using nuclear weapons with the participation of non-nuclear NATO countries, which was reaffirmed at last year's NATO summit in Wales, is being conducted in violation of the first two fundamental articles of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The prospects of ensuring equal and indivisible security for all also directly depend on the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS). We note with satisfaction that the international community has adopted a consolidated position on this issue. It is reflected in the relevant resolutions of the UN General Assembly that are traditionally adopted practically unanimously. The current session of the UN General Assembly adopted by an overwhelming majority vote a new Resolution on No First Placement of Arms in Outer Space that was co-authored by 34 countries.

Speaking in this hall seven years ago I had the honour of submitting to the conference participants on behalf of Russia and China a draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects. We are satisfied that this document has enjoyed broad international support. We are convinced that its recently updated version will create the required foundation for talks at the Conference on Disarmament. We are calling upon all participants to adopt a decision on the start of work on the Russian-Chinese draft as soon as possible and wish you success in this and other areas of your activities, including speedy agreement on the agenda.

Thank you for your attention.